Constitutional Law -- Racial Discrimination -- Expansion of State Action by Curtis, Michael Kent
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 | Number 1 Article 16
12-1-1967
Constitutional Law -- Racial Discrimination --
Expansion of State Action
Michael Kent Curtis
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael K. Curtis, Constitutional Law -- Racial Discrimination -- Expansion of State Action, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 149 (1967).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol46/iss1/16
EXPANSION OF, STATE ACTION
tional rights. Such an objective standard is held in high regard by
the Supreme Court, as indicated by Miranda.3 7 Finally, because of
the warning's content and its likely effect upon the individual, the
warning requirement would encourage authorities to seek the ju-
dicially preferred search warrant.8  The skeptical practice of con-
ducting a warrantless search in reliance upon the individual's un-
informed consent would grow increasingly rare.
It seems fair to say that if courts adopt the Forney-McCarty
position, justice will suffer because fourth amendment rights will
be protected by subjective good faith alone. And, as the Supreme
Court said in Beck v. Ohio:
If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only
in the discretion of the police.89
D. S. DUNKLE
Constitutional Law-Racial Discrimination-Expansion of
State Action
Since the Civil Rights Cases' the Supreme Court has held that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits "state action" and not purely
private action. Subsequent decisions have greatly expanded the
reach of "state action." Indeed the expansion has been so great
that commentators have suggested that the search for "state action"
is a "misleading search,"'2 that some sort of state action can always
be found, and that the Supreme Court should be using a different
mode of analysis.'
' 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
"" See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1956); Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932).
30379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
'See Horwitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957).
'St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State
Action and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicE. L. RaV. 993 (1961) ;
Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. IEv. 3 (1961) ; Williams,
Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347 (1963). Williams suggests
that the test should be whether the private group has so moved into the
area of public concern that the public's interest in eliminating the particular
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Still, in cases involving the application of the proscriptions of
the fourteenth amendment to private organizations, the courts con-
tinue to look for connections between the private organization and
the state. But they have replaced the semantic rigidity of "state
action" with a formula which better explains actual case results. To
hold a private organization to the standards which the fourteenth
amendment sets for the state, the plaintiff must be able to establish
that the state has become "involved" in the discriminatory acts of
the private organization to a "significant extent."'6 In practice,
if the plaintiff can show significant state involvement in a private
organization which serves a public function and can also show dis-
crimination by that private organization, he has established his
case.' He need not show that the state induced or encouraged the
discrimination.
The leading case applying this analysis is Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.7 In Burton the Supreme Court decided that a
private restaurant located in a publicly owned and operated parking
lot could not refuse service to a person because of his race. The
action of the restaurant could not be considered, the Court said,
"so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' In the face of criticism that its decision would sub-
ject a vast number of private organizations to the sweep of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court issued a disclaimer:
discrimination must outweigh the personal right to discriminate. Id. at
389-90.
'Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 1083, 1101-07
(1960) ; Shanks, "State Actioin' and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L.
Rav. 213, 227 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Shanks]. "Under some circum-
stances state contact, control and encouragement may be so intimately
fused with the activities of private groups ... in the performance of a
public function that it seems fair to call the activity 'state action' . . . ." Id.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
6 See, e.g., Smith v. Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.
1966); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y 355 F.2d 118 (4th Cir.
1966); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964);
Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964), vnodifying 220 F.
Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963); Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963). But see, e.g., Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan
Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957).
'365 U.S. 715 (1961).
8Id. at 725. Burton extended earlier case law which had subjected
the private lessee of government property to the fourteenth amendment's
ban on racial discrimination when the purpose of the lease was to pro-
vide a service to the public on state property. Burton ignored the dis-
tinction. 75 HARV. L. Rav. 144 (1961). See, e.g., Derrington v. Plummer,
240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Jones v.
Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
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, . * [T]he conclusions drawn from the facts and circumstances
of this record are by no means declared as universal truths by
means of which every state leasing agreement is to be tested.
Owing to the very largeness of government a multiple of re-
lationships might appear to some to fall within the Amend-
ment's embrace, but that .. .can be determined only in the
framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present. There-
fore respondents' prophecy of nigh universal application of a
constitutional precept so peculiarly dependent for its invocation
upon appropriate facts fails to take into account "Differences
in circumstances [which] beget appropriate differences in law
"9
The purpose of this note is to examine the application of the
concept of state action in the recent case of Ethridge v. Rhodes;"O
to show that Ethridge differs from other state action cases (particu-
larly the progeny of Burton) ; and to consider possible implications
of this difference.
In Ethridge a federal district court applied the fourteenth
amendment to another of the multiple relationships between "pri-
vate" organizations and government. William Ethridge was not
admitted to a Columbus, Ohio, local of the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers because he was a Negro. When he
went directly to construction contractors, he was told that they hired
only through the union."1 In this situation a number of circum-
stances combined to give Ethridge the opportunity for a novel
flank attack on union discrimination.' 2 The State of Ohio was
" 365 U.S. at 725-26. The Court listed the following factors to support its
finding that the public Parking Authority had become involved in the discrim-
ination of the privately owned restaurant to a significant extent. The building
in which the restaurant was located was publicly owned; as an entity the
building was performing an essential governmental function of providing
parking space; the restaurant was physically an integral part of the public
building; and the revenue obtained by leasing the space the restaurant occu-
pied was essential to the state's plan to operate the project as a financially
self-sustaining unit. 365 U.S. at 723-24.
1 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).11 Id. at 85.
2 The legal attack was not entirely novel. See Todd v. joint Apprentice-
ship Comm. of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963),
vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964). In Todd the federal gov-
ernment was building a courthouse. The sub-contractor in question ob-
tained his labor only from the Steel Workers. The two Negro plaintiffs
were accepted by the sub-contractor for work on the project but, in spite of
the vigorous efforts of the federal officer in charge of insuring equal em-
ployment opportunity, the union refused to indenture the plaintiffs. The
district court found the necessary connection between the government and
the private organization simply in the "continued erection of the Federal
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about to build a new medical school building at Ohio State Uni-
versity. The contractors who were about to be awarded the state
building contracts would obtain their labor exclusively from unions.
Like the electrical workers, most of the unions discriminated against
Negroes. The result was summed up by the court:
Since the contractors will hire only through unions and a ma-
jority of craft unions do not have Negro members and will not
refer non-member Negroes, the contractors will hire only non
Negroes in a majority of the crafts needed to work on this
project.,3
The court found that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action
under section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code.' 4 Finding that
the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury, the court enjoined
officers of the state from entering into contracts for the construction
of the Medical Basic Sciences Building with
any persons who are bound by agreement, or otherwise, to
secure their labor force exclusively or primarily from any or-
ganization or source that does not supply or refer laborers and
craftsmen without regard to race, color or membership in a
labor union.:5
Courthouse." By continuing to build the courthouse the federal govern-
ment was "unwillingly fostering and becoming an integral part of" the
union's discrimination. 223 F. Supp. at 20. The court was able to find a
sort of "state action" by the federal government by analogy to Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The court also found government action
in two other aspects of the fact situation less relevant here. For an un-
successful attack on union discrimination applying the analogy to Bolling,
see Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
268 F. Supp. at 87.
1, Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceedings for redress.
1268 F. Supp. at 89. Plaintiffs had several possible remedies. (1) 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964) prohibits discrimination in programs which re-
ceive federal financial assistance. The primary remedy available is the
power of the federal department in question to cut off the federal grant,
loan, or contract. But under § 2000(d)-(3) the act provides that no
action shall be taken by any department or agency with respect to any
employment practice except where the primary objective of the federal
financial assistance is to provide employment.
(2) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-(1) to -(15) (1964) and OHio Rav. CODr
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The court found that "[d]efendants' failure to assure qualified
minority workers equal access to job opportunities on public con-
struction projects by acquiescing in the discriminatory practices of
contractors and craft unions clearly falls within the proscription
of the Fourteenth Amendment ..... 16 According to the court,
the fourteenth amendment's ban on racial discrimination does not
apply to the acts of private persons such as union officials. But
here the state was about to become a "joint participant" in racial
discrimination by "placing itself in a position of interdepen-
dence"17 with the discriminating unions and contractors. "[W]here
a state . . .undertakes to perform essential governmental func-
tions, . . .with the aid of private persons, it cannot avoid the re-
sponsibilities imposed on it by the Fourteenth Amendment by merely
ch. 4112 (Anderson 1965) both contained provisions which the defendants
claimed would be adequate to secure plaintiffs' admission to the unions
in question with back pay. The court dealt with this argument in a cryptic
sentence: it was apparent that the threatened injury was not fully reparable
through the use of these proceedings. Furthermore, the court found that
the remedies proposed were not adequate because they did not take a single
step toward mending the psychological damage done to the party dis-
criminated against. 268 F. Supp. at 88-89. The court dealt with the
problem of a remedy as if the question was simply one of whether the rem-
edy at law was adequate. At least as far as the Ohio statute is concerned
a prior question would seem to be whether Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)
is available xegardless of the existence of a state remedy. This approach to
the question was not taken by the court. The question is beyond the scope
of this note. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); McNeese v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
" 268 F. Supp. at 88. The decree in Ethridge enjoined the State of Ohio
from dealing with contractors who obtained their labor exclusively from
unions which discriminated. It did not take the direct approach of ordering
the union to admit the plaintiff. One reason for not doing so is clear. Since
the contract had not been signed, the union had not yet become a joint par-
ticipant with the government. Thus, the fourteenth amendment did not
yet apply. From the state action aspect of the problem, there seems to be
no basis in logic or authority for drawing the line at enjoining the state
from dealing with discriminatory private organizations. Since the restric-
tions of the fourteenth amendment apply to acts of the state's private part-
ners, the plaintiff (once the project had begun) could sue directly for ad-
mission to the union if he were discriminated against. In the case of Todd
v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Steelworkers, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
1963), vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), the court ordered just
such relief. In other state action cases, the plaintiff has obtained relief
directly against the private organization. Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d 630 (6th
Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
Such an approach might raise problems for the plaintiff beyond the state
action question. See e.g., Note, Alternative Remedies for Denial of Union
Membership: Applicability of Constitutional Relief, 50 CoRIELL L.Q. 75
(1964).
" 268 F. Supp. at 87.
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ignoring or failing to perform them."'18 To support these proposi-
tions the court cited the Burton case.
As the opinion in Ethridge implies, there are important similari-
ties between Ethridge and Burton and the cases which have fol-
lowed Burton."9 Both the State of Ohio and the Wilmington Park-
ing Authority found themselves in a position of "interdependence"
with private discriminators. The Court's suggestion in Burton that
the Parking Authority had a positive duty to see that its lessee did
not discriminate2 ° indicates a parallel duty on the part of state
officials in Ethridge to prevent their contractors from discrimina-
ting. In neither case did the state control the private organization.2
Furthermore, the possibility of limiting Burton to leases of state
property has been ignored. The federal cases which have followed
Burton have not limited it to its peculiar facts or even to lease
agreements. Instead they seem to interpret Burton as meaning that
certain governmental contacts with private organizations serving
'8 Id.
See, e.g., cases cited note 10 supra; Wimbish v. Pinellas County 342
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
20365 U.S. at 725. The Court in Burton said:
[T]he Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge
the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon
the private enterprise as a consequence of state participation. But
no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring
them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive
may be .... By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the
State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but
has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the
admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized
as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that
account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private"
as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
On the state's duty of control, see Comment, State Action and Private
Choice, 50 CORNFLL L.Q. 473, 498 (1965).
1 Some authorities suggest that government "control" of the private
organization is required before the fourteenth amendment can be applied.
E.g., Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C.
1957). "Governmental control is the decisive factor in the determination
of whether a corporation is public or private and governmental control of
the club corporation does not exist." Id. at 108. In most recent state action
cases of this sort, unusual state controls or regulations of the private or-
ganizations have been present. But the controls have not been so extensive
as to justify the assertion that the state "controlled" the private organiza-
tion. See, e.g., Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
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a public function are sufficient to subject the private organization
to the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment. In Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,22 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the state and federal gov-
ernment had become so involved in the activities of an otherwise
private hospital that it could not discriminate on the basis of race
in granting staff privileges. The court found that the necessary
degree of state involvement was present as a result of the hospital's
participation in the Hill-Burton program.23 Just as the Court in
Burton found Eagle Coffee Shoppe an integral part of a public
building devoted to a public service, the court in Simkins found the
hospital an integral part of a joint state-federal program to effect
a proper allocation of available hospital resources.24
Despite the similarities, there are also important practical differ-
ences between Ethridge and earlier state action cases. The differ-
ences exist both in the sort of service the private organization pro-
vided and in the state contact considered sufficient to apply the
proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment. It is difficult to pro-
vide any generalized explanation of the sorts of state contacts which
will subject a private organization to the standard the fourteenth
amendment sets for the state. Indeed, the Supreme Court has im-
plied that it may be "an impossible task."'25  While no precise for-
mula exists, the cases do seem to fit into broad groups. Although
the classification is far from exhaustive, four such groups of cases
should be mentioned: (1) those in which the private organization
is performing an "exclusive" state function,26 (2) those in which
it is performing a function sufficiently like that of the state to sub-
-- 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). Similarly in Smith v. Holiday Inns,
336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964), nodifying 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963),
the Sixth Circuit found that a motel located in a redevelopment area could
not deny service to Negroes. The fact that the Holiday Inn owned the land
did not serve to distinguish the case from Burton. The court pointed to
public design, public financing, and continuing public controls to justify
its decision.
"The Hill-Burton Act, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 291e(f) (1964), provides for federally assisted hospital construction.
Funds to assist the hospital's building program were paid by the United
States to the State of North Carolina and in turn by North Carolina to the
hospitals. 323 F.2d at 963.
" 323 F.2d at 967.
2r 365 U.S. at 722.
"0 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
19671
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ject it to the same standard;27 (3) those in which the private or-
ganization provides a direct service to the public at large on state
property dedicated to public service ;28 (4) those in which the pri-
vate organization receives unusual state aid, state powers, or is sub-
ject to unusual state control.29
The situation in Ethridge does not fit easily into any of these
categories. Constructing buildings is not an exclusive govern-
mental function, such as holding a primary election. Nor is it a
function much like that of the state, such as running a public park.
Nor is it a case of a public service enterprise conducted on public
property. Payment to the contractor is not a sort of state aid
ordinarily thought sufficient to apply the fourteenth amendment.
Of the four categories, the situation in Ethridge looks least like the
first; building buildings is clearly not an exclusive governmental
function.
With the exception of the first, each of these groups of cases
seem to have one common element. In each the fourteenth amend-
ment was applied to private organizations which had significant
state contacts and which provided services directly to the general
public. In Simkins, for example, the hospital received unusual
state aid and control, and it served the public directly. In contrast,
the contractors in Ethridge were not providing a direct public ser-
vice. By constructing a medical school building they were supplying
an entity which stood between them and the general public-that is,
the State of Ohio. In terms of public service their position is
analogous to that of a dairy which supplies milk to a public school
cafeteria.
Thus, Ethridge differs from the other progeny of Burton in
27 The category is just beginning to develop. See Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 396 (1966); Guillory v. Adm'rs of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855
(E.D. La. 1962) (dictum), vacated 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La. 1963),
aff'd per curiam, 305 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 791 (1954),
vacating and remanding 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), aff'g 102 F. Supp.
525 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Jones v. Marva Theatres, 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md.
1960). But cf. Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965).29See, e.g., Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964),
modifying 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963); Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors,
339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir.
1964); Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963);
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 911 (1962); Kerr v. Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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that it applied the fourteenth amendment to an organization which
was supplying the state, rather than to a state "controlled" or assist-
ed organization serving the public.3" The case also represents
the emergence of a new sort of state contact sufficient to apply the
fourteenth amendment's commands to a private organization. The
holding in Ethridge seems to be that, in at least some situations, a
contract with the state is a sufficient state contact. Of course,
cases involving leases of public property have applied the fourteenth
amendment to those in contractual relations with the state. But in
those cases the state contact was thought to be based more on the
nature of the property than on the simple fact of a contractual
agreement."1 These distinctions seem to indicate that Ethridge
has moved the law nearer to the doctrine that states and their ex-
tensions are constitutionally prevented from having economic re-
lations with private businesses that discriminate.
The rationale of Ethridge seems to be that when the state and
a private organization enter a contractual relation, public officials
have a duty and a responsibility to see that public funds do not in-
directly foster private discrimination. If so, the case represents
an application of the fourteenth amendment to a new layer of state-
private relations. Thus, a public school could be enjoined from buy-
ing milk from a dairy which discriminates; state pencils, furniture,
copying machines, and a myriad of other items would have to come
from equal-opportunity employers. Furthermore, one passage in
the court's opinion indicates that the impact might be even more
widespread:
In a venture, such as this one, where the state as a governmental
entity becomes a joint participant with private persons, the
"O Of course, some of the progeny of Burton have involved contacts
other than state assistance or regulations. See, e.g., Hawkins v. North
Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
11 The Court made its decision in Burton assuming that the surplus
property distinction of Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957), would be significant. 365 U.S.
at 723. The court in Derrington thought that when there was "no purpose
of discrimination," no "joinder in the enterprise" and "no reservation of
control" the state could lease property not needed for state purposes to
private persons. If all of these conditions were met the lessee's conduct
would be purely private. Id. at 925. If a mere contractual relation is
enough to hold the lessee to the standard of the fourteenth amendment, the
surplus property distinction "assumed" in Burton would be irrelevant.
A number of commentators have assumed that the nature of the property
rather than the mere fact of a contract was the crucial factor in the lease
cases. 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 144 (1961); Shanks 221.
19671
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply not only to the
actions of the state but also to the acts of its private partners-
the contractors .... 32
Arguably, since the state could not deal with a private organization
which discriminates, neither could its private partners such as the
contractor. His nails, bricks, pipes, and other supplies would all
have to come from equal-opportunity employers. The impact of
such a decision would be ubiquitous; logically the proscriptions of
the fourteenth amendment could be applied to the state's entire chain
of supply.
Another practical problem raised by Ethridge should be briefly
noted. If the sanctions of the fourteenth amendment were directly
applied to private economic organizations in contractual relations
with the state, this would raise the question of how the private or-
ganization could disengage itself and regain its purely private
status. Since the tie with the state would be economic, severing the
tie would probably be sufficient.8" Avoiding the reach of the four-
teenth amendment might be easy enough for an organization not
presently bound by some state contract. But a private organization
which had a long-term state contract and which was determined to
practice racial discrimination might have difficulty. It could find
itself trapped between the rock of equal opportunity and the whirl-
pool of breach of contract.
It is difficult to find a rationale for Ethridge which will both
achieve a desirable result and contain any logical limitation. One
is faced with the spectre of the rationale of the case cruising on its
own logical power through the net of economic "interdependence"
into situations in which the state's contribution to, and responsibil-
ity for, discrimination is very small indeed. Two possible limita-
tions should be mentioned.
First it is possible that Ethridge can be given a narrower read-
ing than that suggested here. There is language in the decision
which suggests some limitation. At one point in its opinion, the
court refers to the situation as one where the state was undertaking
to perform essential governmental functions with the aid of private
persons." But any limitation to those performing essential gov-
268 F. Supp. at 88.
Cf. Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960).
268 F. Supp. at 87.
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ernmental functions seems to be more apparent than real. Even
with such a qualification the decision would seem to reach all those
in contractual relations with the state. It is difficult to see why
the contractor who supplies the state with a hospital building is per-
forming an "essential governmental function," while the company
which supplies the hospital beds is not. Without one, the other is
useless.
While the "essential governmental functions" test seems to pro-
vide no effective limitation, one commentator has suggested a test
which might. The question would be whether the state is the
"effective source" of the discrimination.3 5
In determining whether the state is the effective source of the
discrimination, the relationship with the state is all that is im-
portant. It is irrelevant that the private party is also responsible
for the discrimination; only by showing that the state is not
responsible may constitutional restraints be avoided.36
Of course there are various degrees of state contribution to dis-
crimination. Application of the test to a situation of the Ethridge
type seems to require a practical inquiry into the extent of the
state's contribution to and, hence, responsibility for, discrimina-
tion. In Ethridge, by its decision to build a medical school build-
ing, the state created all the construction jobs on the project. With-
out the state's economic participation these jobs simply would not
exist. It is hard to imagine a situation in which a state, by simply
awarding a contract to a private discriminator, could do more to
contribute to discrimination. When the state is only a very small
buyer among a great many (for example, in the purchase of tooth-
paste for state institutions) the state's contribution to discrimina-
tion is less.
Ethridge is in keeping with the current judicial trend toward
the expansion of "state action." It reached a desirable result: jobs
created by government funds alone should be open to qualified ap-
plicants without regard to race. Ethridge clearly differs from
earlier state action cases in that it applied the fourteenth amendment
to a new layer of state-private relations. An earlier line of cases
had applied the fourteenth amendment to private organizations
receiving unusual state aid (and often subject to unusual regula-
" Shanks 231.38 Id. at 232.
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tion). a7 Ethridge seems to extend this line of cases to (at least
some) payments made under state contracts. Together Ethridge
and the earlier line of cases seem to be consistent with a new prin-
ciple. Substantial state payments to a discriminating private or-
ganization make the discriminatory acts of the private organization
"state action."381
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS
Defamation-Damages-Requirements for Collection of
Substantial Damages in Actionable Per Se Defamation
In R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers,' a defamation
action arising out of a labor organization campaign, the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated the following rule in regard to
damages recoverable for a defamatory statement adjudged actionable
per se :2
"See, e.g., Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963).
" Compare Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964)
with Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) and
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
1270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E.2d 344 (1967). For the complete text of the
defendant's five further answers and defenses and the various motions, de-
murrers and rulings that gave rise to its appeal, see id. at 163-66, 154 S.E.2d
at 349-51. The basic issues raised concern questions of qualified privilege in
labor organization campaign communications, federal preemption of labor
defamation actions under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
1964), and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
1964), state jurisdiction to award damages for labor dispute defamation
under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,
and whether plaintiff's damages allegations were sufficient to state a cause
of action. The court held in favor of the plaintiff on all questions but that
of privilege, ruling on that point that the defense of qualified privilege does
extend to defamatory statements made during labor organization campaigns.
2 Defamation considered sufficient to establish a cause of action without
proof of specific monetary loss, i.e., special damages, is referred to as action-
able per se. Slander is generally not actionable per se unless it imputes
commission of a crime, a loathsome disease, unchastity to a woman, or
tends to affect the plaintiff in his trade or profession. W. PROSSER, LAW or
ToRTs 772 (3d ed. 1964). Under the common law, all libel was considered
actionable per se. However, confusion has arisen in this country over the
division of libel into two types-libel per se and libel per quod. In some
states, libel per se-or libel defamatory on its face-maintains its actionable
per se character, although libel per quod-that requiring the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to establish its defamatory nature-is not considered
actionable without proof of special damages. Prosser, More Libel Per
Quod, 79 HARv. L. Rnv. 1629 (1966) ; Eldridge, The Spurious Ride of Libel
Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1966). The North Carolina courts have
not escaped this confusion. See Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d
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